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TRANSFORMING THE NAVY
Punching a Feather Bed?
Peter J. Dombrowski and Andrew L. Ross

To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You
punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are
finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before
you started punching.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

T

he Bush administration has made military transformation a central defense
1
and national security objective. It came into office declaring its commitment to profound, potentially radical military change. Even while engaged in the
global war on terror, preparing to go to war against and then fighting one rogue
state, and deterring another, the U.S. military has been pressed to remake itself.
Indeed, the threat of terrorism is said to demonstrate the need for transformation, and a possible war in Southwest Asia has been viewed by some as an opportunity to showcase the military’s emerging transformational capabilities. While
deployed across multiple theaters, the armed forces are to develop a coherent
view of the future and to begin implementing the technological, doctrinal, and
organizational changes necessary to meet future warfighting requirements.
Moreover, this is to be done in a budget environment in which, despite dramatically increased defense spending, flexibility is limited by current operating expenses. By any standard, this is a tall order. Yet civilian officials in the
Department of Defense continue to push the military to think more creatively
and move more quickly. Individuals, programs, and services thought to stand in
2
the way of building the “military after next” have been taken to task.
The Navy claims that its challenges are particularly difficult. The fleet has
shrunk. It is likely to shrink still further before it grows. Programmed recapitalization and modernization are thought to exceed the resources expected to be
available. Operational requirements have dictated more frequent, and longer,
deployments. Operating tempo has spiked. The fleet and resources are stretched
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thin. Is now the time to transform, to introduce new platforms and force the naval acquisition system and the naval industrial base to adopt new business practices and achieve greater economies? For transformation proponents, the
answer is a resounding “Yes.”
Of course, some within the Navy had begun to think about the next Navy and
even the Navy after next well before Governor George W. Bush was selected to be
president. Over the last decade, the concept of network-centric warfare, which
calls for a profound “shift from platform-centric operations to Network Centric
3
Operations,” gained gradual, if often grudging, acceptance. Network-centric
warfare, in the form of “ForceNet,” is at the heart of “Sea Power 21,” which was
introduced in 2002 as the Navy’s transformation vision. ForceNet is the integrating agent of SP-21’s “Sea Strike,” “Sea Shield,” and “Sea Basing,” which are to increase the Navy’s capacity to strike deeply and sustain joint operations even in
the absence of land bases, as well as to help protect both the American homeland
and U.S. allies and friends against ballistic missiles and other threats. Intended
as a comprehensive guide to naval transformation, Sea Power 21 also reflects an
appreciation of the long-term demands of waging the war on terror and combating weapons of mass destruction, as well as of how the Bush administration is
likely to employ military power.
We present here a four-part, interim assessment of the Navy’s ongoing trans4
formation project. First, we provide the context for our assessment with a review of the administration’s approach to transformation. Second, we describe Sea
Power 21 and its network-centric-warfare underpinnings. In the third section we
examine whether the Navy’s vision of its future is indeed transformational and
the extent to which the Navy is progressing toward its vision’s promise. We conclude by evaluating the prospects for Navy transformation and by asking
whether the force envisioned by Sea Power 21 will meet the nation’s national
security requirements in the coming decades.
THE TRANSFORMATION IMPERATIVE
An array of joint and service transformation visions had been developed even
before the Bush administration took office. Joint Vision 2020, like Joint Vision
2010 before it, foresees a military able to dominate the full spectrum of military
operations, from low-intensity conflict to major theater wars. Information superiority is to be the underpinning of “dominant maneuver,” “precision engagement,” “focused logistics,” and “full-dimensional protection.”5 U.S. forces are
expected to prevail over any and all military challengers by moving more
quickly, hitting harder and more precisely, and when necessary, sustaining operations longer than potential adversaries.
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Not only the Navy but the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps have developed
transformation visions. The Army’s transformation project promises to deliver
an “Objective Force” with a Future Combat System that will be responsive, de6
ployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. The Air Force’s
Vision 2020 promises “Global Vigilance, Reach and Power” through a full7
spectrum aerospace force to control and exploit not only the air but also space.
Air Force assets are to be able “to find, fix, assess, track, target, and engage any
object of military significance on or above the surface of the Earth in near real
8
time.” Marine Corps Strategy 21 and the Corps’s “Operational Maneuver from
the Sea” doctrine promise scalable, interoperable expeditionary forces at a high
9
level of readiness.
Since each service is attempting to exploit the opportunities presented by
modern information technologies and is responding to the overarching guidance provided in such documents as Joint Vision 2020 and the National Military
Strategy, there are many commonalities across the individual visions. Each service claims, to one degree or another, to be expeditionary; even the Army is
lightening its forces, in order to increase mobility and sustainability. Each vision
also focuses on the ability to strike adversaries with a variety of weapons; no potential target anywhere in any environment—land, sea, air, space, or cyberspace—will not, in the end, be vulnerable to U.S. forces. Strike operations are to
be enabled by “information dominance”—which, reduced to its essentials,
means improving the intelligence available to all echelons, but especially shooters. A premium is placed on precision, speed, agility, flexibility, adaptability, and
connectivity. Operations are to be conducted in parallel rather than sequentially.
All of the services genuflect before the requirements for jointness and
interoperability.
In 2001, the stakes were raised. A new administration took office proclaiming
its commitment to transformation. Military transformation had emerged as an
article of faith for the Bush team during the presidential campaign. In his September 1999 Citadel speech, then-Governor Bush called for “creating the military of the next century,” seizing the opportunity “created by a revolution in the
technology of war,” moving beyond “marginal improvements,” “skipping ‘a gen10
eration of technology,’ ” and encouraging “a new spirit of innovation.”
In remarks at the Joint Forces Command in February 2001, the new president
returned to the themes of his Citadel address:
We are witnessing a revolution in the technology [of] war. Power is increasingly defined not by size, but by mobility and swiftness. Advantage increasingly comes from
information. . . . Our goal is to move beyond marginal improvements to harness new
technologies that will support a new strategy. . . . On land, heavy forces will be
lighter. Our light forces will be more lethal. . . . In the air, we’ll be able to strike across
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the world with pinpoint accuracy, using both aircraft and unmanned systems. On the
oceans, we’ll connect information and weapons in new ways, maximizing our ability
to project power over land.11

Upon assuming office, the new secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld,
moved quickly to initiate the “comprehensive review” of military strategy, structure, and procurement priorities promised by President Bush. Andrew W.
Marshall, the director of net assessment and a longtime proponent of transfor12
mation, was tapped to lead a wide-ranging review of U.S. defense strategy. Additional teams were formed to focus on transformation, conventional forces,
nuclear forces, missile defense, space, crisis response, acquisition reform, and
13
quality of life, among other issues. An Office of Force Transformation, led by
Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN (Ret.), a leading advocate of networkcentric warfare, was established. The services were directed by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) to develop transformation roadmaps. A Defense
Transformation Guidance document was developed to accompany OSD’s Defense Planning Guidance. These and other initiatives clearly signaled the importance of far-reaching military innovation to the Bush team.
The administration’s commitment to transformation was formalized in the
Defense Department’s September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review report.
Even in the wake of the attacks of 11 September and the onset of the global war
on terror, the secretary of defense continued to emphasize the importance of
“the transformation of U.S. forces, capabilities, and institutions.”14 Transformation was once again proclaimed to be “at the heart” of the administration’s “new
15
strategic approach.” Indeed, a renewed sense of urgency was conveyed: “Transformation is not a goal for tomorrow, but an endeavor that must be embraced in
16
earnest today.” Four transformation pillars—joint operations; experimentation; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and research and development and selective recapitalization—and a set of “six critical operational
goals” were identified.17
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) Pete
18
Aldridge has remarked that “transformation is a loose concept.” Yet administration officials have attempted to pin down the meaning of “transformation.”
The most prominent dimensions of transformation—technology, doctrine, and
organization—were evident in the characterization of transformation provided
19
in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report:
Transformation results from the exploitation of new approaches to operational concepts and capabilities, the use of old and new technologies, and new forms of organization that more effectively anticipate new or still emerging strategic and operational
challenges and opportunities and that render previous methods of conducting war
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obsolete or subordinate. Transformation can involve fundamental change in the form of
military operations, as well as potential change in their scale. It can encompass the
displacement of one form of war with another, such as fundamental change in the ways
war is waged in the air, on land and at sea. It can also involve the emergence of new
kinds of war, such as armed conflict in new dimensions of the battle space.20

The administration’s characterization of transformation suggests that remaking the armed forces requires more than routine, sustaining innovation. As
the 2002 Annual Report explicitly recognized, transformation entails “discontin21
uous change,” not merely the incremental change typical of modernization.
22
Risks are to be taken. Transformation is to result in fundamentally new, rather
than merely improved, technologies and weapons systems, doctrines, and operational concepts. Revolutionary rather than evolutionary change is the objec23
tive. Marginal improvements in capabilities are to be rejected in favor of leaps
24
ahead. As indicated by the QDR’s use of language evocative of a “revolution in
military affairs,” its discussion of transformation’s “social” dimensions, its recognition of the necessity for “fundamental changes . . . in organizational culture
and behavior,” and the military’s palpable concern about the administration’s
25
transformation agenda, the stage has been set for disruptive innovation.
Even in the face of the military’s increased responsibilities for homeland security, the demands of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the complexities of the
broader global war on terror, and preparations for and then war against Iraq, the
transformation imperative has remained among the highest priorities of the
26
Bush administration. The September 2002 National Security Strategy, for example, called for transforming the U.S. armed forces and other national security
27
institutions to maintain and enhance American primacy. The Bush administration, seemingly, has repudiated the Clinton administration’s approach to
transformation and embraced the approach of the 1997 National Defense Panel,
which recommended “transforming the armed forces into a very different kind
of military from that which exists today,” for according “the highest priority to
28
executing a transformation strategy,” and for accelerating transformation.
Against this backdrop, the U.S. Navy and the other armed services have struggled to turn such nascent concepts as network-centric warfare from abstract exercises in strategic thinking into full-fledged transformation plans.
THE NAVY TRANSFORMATION VISION
Publicly unveiled by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vernon Clark, at
the Naval War College in June 2002, “Sea Power 21” is the most complete, and recent, depiction of the Navy’s transformation vision.29 It is a successor to . . . From
the Sea and Forward . . . from the Sea, post–Cold War visions that profoundly
reoriented the Navy away from blue-water fleet-on-fleet engagements to
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30

projecting power ashore in the littorals. Sea Power 21, however, is focused as
much on how the Navy will fight in the future as on where it will fight. The offensive Sea Strike, defensive Sea Shield, and facilitating Sea Basing capabilities it
calls for are to be integrated by ForceNet, which is to “network” the future Navy’s
formidable capabilities. The inspiration for Sea Power 21’s emphasis on the
force-multiplying, potentially transforming, effects of connectivity and networking is network-centric warfare, a concept of future warfare long advocated
31
by former Naval War College president Vice Admiral Cebrowski. In the form of
ForceNet, network-centric warfare is embedded in Sea Power 21’s vision of how
32
the Navy will “organize, integrate, and transform.”
Network-centric Warfare
For its proponents, network-centric warfare is the emerging vision of the future
33
of war. It is a vision driven by a particular understanding of the transformation
of modern society from the industrial age to a postindustrial, or information,
34
age at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Advances in information technologies that have resulted in widespread socioeconomic changes are expected
35
to revolutionize the conduct, if not the nature, of war. In particular, the increasing use of networks for organizing human activities is touted as a means for
36
reshaping the way American forces train, organize, equip, and fight.
In brief, networks harness the power of geographically dispersed nodes
(whether personal computers, delivery trucks, or warships) by linking them together into networks (such as the World Wide Web) that allow for the extremely
rapid, high-volume transmission of digitized data (multimedia). Networking
has the potential to increase exponentially the capabilities of individual nodes or
groups of nodes and to render the use of resources more efficient. In theory, networked nodes have access not only to their own resident capabilities but also,
more importantly, to capabilities distributed across the network. The loss of a
networked node need not be crippling; in a robust network, its functions can
and will be assumed by other nodes. Since networked nodes can share information efficiently, they can be designed individually as relatively simple, low-cost
37
adjuncts to the network itself.
The Navy and the other services have been developing, individually if not
38
jointly, the capabilities for network-centric operations (NCO). In a draft capstone concept paper, the Navy Warfare Development Command identified four
NCO “pillars,” or supporting concepts: information and knowledge advantage, effects-based operations, assured access, and “forward sea-based forces”
39
(see figure 1).
The benefits of NCO to be provided by the pillars of information and knowledge advantage and effects-based operations include speed of command,
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40

self-synchronization, advanced targeting, and greater tactical stability. Netted
sensors are to provide shooters and commanders with “unmatched awareness of
41
the battle space.” Within the battle space, war fighters are to be able to
“self-synchronize” their activities to fulfill a commander’s intent by drawing upon
a shared “rule set—or doctrine,” as
FIGURE 1
well as a common operational picNetwork-centric Operations
42
ture (COP). Self-synchronization
is accomplished by devolving deciWarfare deriving power from robust rapid networking of
well-informed geographically dispersed forces
sion making downward to the lowest
Effects-Based
· Warfare Not Hardware
appropriate level, thus allowing war
Operations
· Networked Warfighters Not Just
fighters to respond directly and
Nets
quickly to tactical, operational, and
· Real-Time Shared Knowledge
Information
and
Knowledge
even strategic challenges. “Fires”
· Dispersed Forces/Concentrated,
Advantage
High Volume Effects
(munitions delivery) are to be em· Integrates Surveillance, Strike, Assured Fwd Sea-Based
ployed in a framework of effectsand Maneuver
Access
Forces
based operations rather than of
Dominate Tempo and Foreclose Enemy Options
Agile, Anticipatory Operations Using High Rates of
attrition-based warfare. PrecisionChange to Shock the Enemy and Lock Out His Options
guided munitions in conjunction
Source: NWDC, Network Centric Operations, p. ii.
with advanced ISR capabilities will
allow targets to be hit with greater economy—simultaneously rather than
sequentially—greatly increasing the possibility of imposing disproportionate
effects, particularly psychological ones, on the adversary. Tactical operations
may thus achieve strategic objectives.
By geographically dispersing sensors, shooters, and their supporting infrastructure within an overarching network, U.S. forces will be able to achieve
greater tactical stability—a favorable balance between survivability and combat
43
power. Fires, rather than forces, will be massed, and they will be delivered from
beyond visual range. Ideally, effects-based operations, fueled by information
and knowledge superiority, will enable U.S. forces to “lock in success and lock
44
out enemy solutions.” Smaller, lighter, faster, less complex, and less expensive
nodes (i.e., platforms) linked by interoperable, highly redundant, self-healing
networks will present adversaries with fewer high-value targets and improve the
robustness of operations against a determined foe.
Implicitly at least, NCO is a joint vision that harnesses capabilities from all
45
services; it is applicable to warfare on land, air, or sea. That it is a Navy concept
with naval origins, however, is evident in the two pillars that are more distinctly
maritime: assured access and forward-deployed sea forces. “Assured access” refers to the ability of the U.S. armed forces to gain entry to and use both overseas
infrastructure, such as ports and airfields, and the battle space itself, even when
46
confronted by a capable and active adversary. No sanctuary is to be ceded to the
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opponent. It is the job of the Navy and the Marine Corps to enable and ensure
access by follow-on elements of the Air Force and the Army—the heavier forces
necessary to fight and win major theater wars. The Navy accomplishes this
through the combat capabilities inherent in its forward-deployed presence assets (i.e., the ability to operate in the littoral). Since sea-based forces “do not rely
on permissive access to foreign shore installations that may be withdrawn or
47
curtailed,” they “furnish an assured infrastructure for additional joint forces.”
The most robust form of NCW also features a wide variety of nodes (or platforms) that are to be smaller, lighter, faster, or less complex than current platforms. Unmanned vehicles, for instance, are to deploy sensors or serve as
sensors, communications relays, and weapons platforms. In the view of its
strongest advocates, NCW requires innovative design concepts such as small littoral combatants (a concept formerly known as “Streetfighter”), fast lift, and
small-deck aircraft carriers. According to their logic, fulfilling the ultimate
promise of network-centric operations requires less complex and less expensive
network-tailored nodes/platforms that will facilitate self-synchronization and
“swarming” tactics and increase tactical survivability.48 Complexity is to be located on the web rather than on the node; the expensive platform nodes that
populate the legacy force will be displaced by simpler, less expensive ones. In today’s Navy, platforms are networked via, for instance, the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and IT-21. In the network-centric Navy of the future,
nodes will be tailored to network requirements from their earliest conception.
Sea Power 21
Network-centric warfare, in the form of ForceNet, is “the ‘glue’ that binds together” Sea Power 21’s “three fundamental concepts”: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and
49
Sea Basing. Integrated by ForceNet, the offensive and defensive capabilities of
Sea Strike and Sea Shield and the operational autonomy of Sea Basing are to provide “unprecedented maritime power”—nothing less than “decisive warfighting
50
capabilities from the sea.” The development of these capabilities will be supported by three additional elements of Sea Power 21: “Sea Trial’s” innovation
processes, “Sea Warrior’s” investment in people, and “Sea Enterprise’s” improved business practices. SP-21 is driven not by the asymmetrical challenges
posed by regional or transnational threats but by a concerted effort to exploit (and
thereby help preserve) the asymmetry inherent in U.S. technological preemi51
nence; accordingly, it is to provide “powerful warfighting capabilities” that “will
52
ensure our joint force dominates the unified battle space of the 21st century.”
The core operational concepts of Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing, the
“operational construct and architectural framework” of ForceNet, and the three
supporting concepts had all appeared earlier in the Department of the Navy’s
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53

Naval Transformation Roadmap. Beginning in June 2002, these concepts took
the form of “Sea Power 21” in a series of speeches and articles by the Chief of Na54
val Operations and other flag and general officers. Sea Power 21 represents a
concerted effort to market as transformational the future capabilities sought by
the Navy’s leadership, civilian and military alike. The array of capabilities envisioned by the NTR and SP-21,
TABLE 1
THE NTR’S AND SP-21’S TRANSFORMATIONAL
which are to be developed in a
WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES
phased process from 2002–2020,
Sea Strike
55
are depicted in table 1.
• Persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
• Time-sensitive strike
With the promulgation of the
• Offensive information operations
Naval Transformation Road• Ship-to-objective maneuver
• Covert strike
map and Sea Power 21 in 2002,
Sea Shield
network-centric concepts, in the
• Homeland defense
• Sea/littoral superiority
form of ForceNet, are for the first
• Theater air and missile defense
time firmly embedded in the
• Force entry enabling
Sea Basing
official version of naval transfor• Enhanced afloat positioning of joint assets
mation. It remains to be seen,
• Accelerated deployment and employment time
however, whether naval transforForceNet
• Expeditionary, multitiered sensor and weapons grid
mation will fulfill the overarching
• Distributed, collaborative command and control
vision of transformation sug• Dynamic, multipath, and survivable networks
• Adaptive/automated decision aids
gested by Joint Vision 2020 and
• Human-centric integration
the Bush administration’s defense
Source: Naval Transformation Roadmap: Power and Access . . . from the Sea (Washington, D.C.:
Dept. of the Navy, 2002); and Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy, “Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive
planning documents.
Capabilities,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (October 2002), pp. 32–41.
EVALUATING NAVAL TRANSFORMATION
There are two ways to assess the Navy’s transformation enterprise. First, it can be
evaluated against transformation objectives articulated by President Bush and
the members of his national security team. In effect, this approach uses a measure external to the Navy. Second, Navy transformation can be assessed in terms
of how well the Navy has implemented to date its own concepts. This approach
measures internal progress toward the Navy’s stated objectives.
We argue here that although the Navy has made progress toward developing a
coherent transformation vision over the past decade, there are gaps between the
administration’s stated objectives and the Navy’s transformation enterprise. As
for the overall prospects for transformation, a definitive judgment cannot yet be
rendered; much depends on how well the Navy supports the headline goals of
Sea Power 21 and NCW over time. It is difficult to evaluate the implementation
of the Navy’s vision, because the effort cannot be expected to bear fruit for another ten years or more. However, there are already signs that as a result of
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budgetary, bureaucratic, and political impediments to transformation, implementation is lagging and will continue to lag.
Does Naval Transformation Measure Up?
Judged against the expectations created by the president and his defense team,
the naval transformation enterprise will fall short, even if—and this is a big if—
it is fully implemented in the coming decades. Transformation advocates within
OSD, including the Office of Force Transformation, believe that transformation
is a matter of discontinuous, even “revolutionary,” change. Yet while neither the
next Navy (of 2010) nor the Navy after next (of 2020) will look exactly like today’s Navy, they will be quite recognizable. With a few important exceptions, operational capabilities are unlikely to have been transformed; instead, capabilities
resident in the current Navy will have been improved.
56
The Navy advertises Sea Power 21 as a “new operational construct.” Yet
much of Sea Power 21 is a repackaging of familiar ideas. The Navy has long possessed offensive, defensive, and presence capabilities. Although relabeled “Sea
Strike,” “Sea Shield,” and “Sea Basing,” those capabilities will continue to be enhanced, or modernized; they are unlikely to be revolutionized. The “new opera57
tional construct” essentially calls for routine, sustaining modernization.
A similar judgment can be rendered against network-centric operations. At
the most basic level, the desirability of the kinds of information and knowledge
advantages touted by NCO is not new. Military commanders since time imme58
morial have sought more and better information. As for effects-based operations, the Navy, indeed all branches of the military, have often sought to destroy
targets with an eye to the reactions of enemy forces and political decision makers. Was not strategic bombing in World War II intended to break the will of the
English, German, and Japanese citizenries? Assured access is not a novel idea either. The Navy has long provided battlespace access for other components of the
total force; did it not make it possible for the Marines and Army to island-hop
across the Pacific? The Navy has also long been the provider of “forward
sea-based forces.”59 Dominating the tempo of war and foreclosing adversary options is also a traditional warfighting objective. How all of this is achieved will
certainly be improved, but it is not clear that the Navy will be revolutionized.
Neither is the Navy new to the information age. ForceNet builds upon exist60
ing Navy information technology capabilities and programs. Few if any of the
envisioned capabilities entail skipping a generation of technology; if anything,
even with the advent of spiral development, Navy information technologies will
continue to lag behind those of the civilian IT sector. Indeed, existing plans from
the Navy–Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) to CEC, the Naval Fires Network
(NFN), and the Expeditionary Sensor Grid (ESG) will incorporate and build
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upon existing networks to enhance future connectivity. Sustaining innovation is
likely to continue to be the norm. Tellingly, the performance metrics of the
nodes, or platforms, and networks envisioned by NCW and NCO require less
61
discontinuous and disruptive innovation than sustaining innovation.
The sense of urgency attached to transformation by the president is little evident in the NTR and other Navy planning documents. For the Navy, it seems that
thus far transformation means business as usual—incremental, evolutionary
changes in both capabilities and the doctrine necessary to employ those capabilities. There is no evident generation-skipping. The NTR, in particular, features
rampant incrementalism. It calls for “more effectively” utilizing and exploiting
assets; for enhancing, increasing, improving (sometimes significantly), and leveraging existing capabilities while accelerating certain current programs. Risk taking is also difficult to detect; indeed, the Navy has remained steadfastly risk averse.
The evolution since the mid-1990s of the Navy’s plans for a future carrier is
instructive. Initially, with what was “CVX,” the Navy took an ambitious,
clean-sheet design approach that may well have resulted in the skipping of a generation, a leap ahead. Due to budgetary constraints and reluctance to assume
technological risks, that approach was scaled back with the shift to “CVNX,” a
distinctly evolutionary program intended to yield a next-generation carrier. By
most accounts, it was only pressure from OSD for a “CVN-21” incorporating a
range of emerging technologies that prevented the Navy’s next carrier from being merely a slightly improved Nimitz-class carrier. Just how transformational
the Navy’s next carrier will actually be is an open question. The point is that the
Navy reached ahead as far as it did only because it was pushed by OSD.
Some analysts have speculated that Navy programs might be vulnerable after
the cancellation of the Army’s Crusader artillery system. But few Navy programs
62
have been canceled to free up resources for transformation. Instead, such existing programs as the Joint Strike Fighter are billed as transformational. Further,
the alignment of programs and resources with the Navy transformation vision
and roadmap is far from seamless. Programs remain platform-centric rather
63
than network-centric. In the course of his remarks at Ship Tech 2003, Rear Admiral Jay Cohen, Chief of Naval Research, characterized SP-21 and the NTR as
“ship-centric.” Science and technology, and research and development, programs remain focused more on near-term technology transition to the fleet than
on the long-term basic S&T/R&D that may be required for true transformation.
Routine modernization and the recapitalization of legacy systems appear to
64
overshadow programs that could yield disruptive innovation.
Navy transformation to date is thus a rather modest enterprise. It is difficult
to distinguish from modernization. It emphasizes sustaining innovation and incremental, evolutionary change. At best, it amounts to “modernization plus.”
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Barring unforeseen developments, the Navy will continue to do what it does
now, only better. The Navy’s transformation enterprise does not live up to the
expectations created by the Bush defense team; Sea Power 21 is unlikely to result
in transformation.
It must be acknowledged, however, that the Navy’s measured, incremental,
evolutionary approach to transformation is actually not entirely out of sync
with OSD’s approach. The urgency attached to transformation, the emphasis on
discontinuous—even disruptive—change, evident in the QDR, the 2002 Annual
Report, and elsewhere is not absolute. Administration officials recognize that
transformation is a long-term process, that its promise will be fully realized only
65
with the passage of time. “Today’s challenges” must be addressed even while
the military is transforming for the future; future readiness is not to be ensured
66
at the expense of current readiness. Prudence and balance are ever the watchwords: “It would be imprudent to transform the entire force all at once. A balance must be struck between the need to meet current threats while
67
transforming the force over time.” This approach, which much resembles that
of the Clinton administration, is unlikely to result in a rush to transformation by
the Navy—or any of the other services.
Modernization Plus
Each of Sea Power 21’s major foci provide possible exceptions to the argument
that current plans for Navy transformation do not measure up. Several initiatives particularly deserve attention.
Sea Strike. A range of strike platforms have been portrayed as “undergoing a rev68
olution in capability.” For instance, SSGNs—Trident ballistic-missile submarines converted to attack boats, carrying cruise missiles and unmanned vehicles
and deploying special-operations forces—will have Arsenal Ship–like capabilities; indeed, they will be even more stealthy than the Arsenal Ship would have
been. SSGNs will also bolster the Navy’s existing cruise-missile launch capability
(if not the number of cruise missiles available for launch). Why four SSGNs
should be regarded as transformational, however, is not evident.
The DD(X) destroyer, CG(X) cruiser, and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) have
69
also been characterized as revolutionary. This “Surface Combatant Family of
Ships,” however, may be no more a radical departure than the aforementioned
CVN(X). That DD(X) is being designed as a multimission land-attack destroyer
is in line with the Navy’s post–Cold War reorientation from blue water to the
littoral. As for the LCS, given the vehement reaction to the concept of a
Streetfighter when it was introduced, it is no less noteworthy that the Navy
is not only proceeding with the program but is seriously considering alterna70
tive hull designs, some of which are of foreign origin. Yet the mix of surface
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combatant capabilities represented by this family of ships inspires a sense of déjà
vu. As two retired admirals have pointed out, “The Family of Ships is really a
71
21st-century version of the high-low mix of the 1970s.” This reincarnated
high-low mix may be undermined by two of the problems that doomed the earlier attempt: at the low end, cost growth; at the high end, inability to procure the
number of platforms required to make the mix work. The Navy has not yet escaped the tyranny of resource constraints.
Many transformation proponents have highlighted the potentially revolutionary impact of unmanned vehicles on military operations from reconnaissance to strike. Sea Strike envisions a future battle space populated by an array
of unmanned vehicles—aerial, surface, and subsurface. Yet the Navy’s
unmanned-vehicle programs appear to lag behind Air Force, Army, and Marine
counterparts. This is especially true for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
According to one recent report, there are fourteen separate Navy unmannedvehicle programs. Seven are UAVs; of those, five are being used, or will be used,
in very limited numbers for testing, training, or developmental training; the
other two (Northrop Grumman’s Pegasus and Boeing’s X-45) are largely
funded by the Defense Advanced Research Agency and are not projected to see
naval service until 2015. As for Global Hawk, a now well-known UAV that was
first rushed into operation for the Afghanistan campaign, the Navy plans to
72
purchase only two systems, one in 2005 and one in 2007. The Navy has also
sought a hundred million dollars to upgrade a Pioneer system that dates back to
the mid-1980s. By contrast the U.S. Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps have deployed relatively new, relatively capable UAVs even as they continue to test and
evaluate next-generation systems.
Perhaps this is unfair. After all, there is something to the claim that operating
UAVs in a maritime environment poses challenges not faced by ground-based
systems. Launch and recovery of ship-based naval UAVs, for example, presents
serious technical challenges. Finding space to store, maintain, and operate UAVs
on vessels not originally designed to host them can be problematical. Moreover,
if the Navy is able to field reconnaissance variants of either the Pegasus or the
X-45 by 2015 as planned, the service will actually be on track to meet the needs
of the Navy after next.
Even though the utility of UAVs has become increasingly clear over the past
two decades, the Navy has been slow to recognize their value. It has pursued unmanned aerial vehicles only in fits and starts. Representatives of one major UAV
manufacturer told one of the authors that they “hated” doing business with the
Navy, because it spent so much time researching operational requirements and
testing existing systems. They doubted that the Navy would ever actually field a
73
system. The Fire Scout vertical-takeoff-and-landing UAV program, whatever
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its specific merits, seems representative; after an initial investment the Navy
pulled back from production in early 2002, all but terminating the program, and
began thinking once again about new UAV designs and concepts. Then, early in
74
2003, Fire Scout was reinvigorated.
Even UAV-related developments with regard to one of the Navy’s most highly
touted near-term transformation programs, the SSGN conversion, may represent less than meets the eye. In the winter of 2003, the Giant Shadow experiment
“absolutely validated that UAVs provide a great value, on the tactical and operational level of war, to an SSGN that’s operating as . . . an ISR home base,” according to the commander of the experiment’s joint force maritime component.75
One element of the overall experiment tested the ability of a land-launched Boeing/
Insitu ScanEagle UAV to communicate with the submarine and other naval assets. Yet Aerospace Daily quoted the maritime component commander as concluding, “I’d like to pursue a UAV for submarines, although I’m not convinced
that [ScanEagle] is it. . . . Its wingspan is too big [and] the launching . . . was
76
sometimes problematic.” Modification of the ScanEagle, other competing
UAV designs, or the development of a UAV designed specifically to operate from
submarines may have to wait, however, given current programming.
Sea Shield. Much of Sea Shield, at least as described in publicly available documents, is not new. It prominently features traditional force protection missions—
air defense, mine countermeasures, and antisubmarine warfare programs—and
ensuring access to the littoral. Potentially more disruptive, however, are plans to
provide theater ballistic missile defense and ballistic missile defense from
sea-based platforms. In the words of Admiral Clark,
It [Sea Shield] is about projecting global defensive assurance, projecting defense. . . .
Traditionally, naval defense has been concerned with protecting our units or the
force, and the sea lines of communication. Tomorrow’s navy must of course do all of
that, but we must be able to do much more: projecting defensive technology beyond
the task force, providing theatre and strategic defense for the first time.77

In short, the U.S. Navy is preparing to play a central role in defending the
homeland not against the seaborne invasions of old but ballistic missiles armed
78
with weapons of mass destruction. The Navy’s sea-based “Mid-Course” system
is expressly intended to protect population areas from ballistic missile threats.
Navy assets committed to this homeland defense mission become “strategic” in
the same sense that the fleet’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) have been
79
strategic. Also like SSBNs, they are unlikely to be available for other missions.
Although the long-term effects of this aspect of Sea Shield on the Navy remain to be seen, stationing a picket line of ships to track and intercept ballistic
missiles aimed at the American homeland or an allied population center may
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very well change the culture of the service. Rather than engaging the enemy fleet
on the high seas or striking enemy forces in the littoral or far inland, Navy officers and enlisted personnel will be asked to wait and respond to an attack. Taken
to the extreme, crews onboard ships dedicated to missile defense will be akin to
80
missile launch officers sitting in silos waiting for the balloon to go up.
Sea Basing. Since 11 September 2001 it has become apparent that the United
States may be involved in conflicts of longer duration than at any time since the
Vietnam War. Future operations in failed or failing states, for example, may require it to commit forces for years rather than months. Access to bases in neighboring countries will not always be readily available; neutral states and even a
few allies have been reluctant to grant the U.S. military unrestricted access to facilities or overflight rights at various points during the war on terror and during
preparations for a potential invasion of Iraq. More of the same can be expected
in the future. As a result the United States may increasingly rely on sea-based
forces to conduct strike operations and support ground forces.
Sea Power 21’s emphasis on sea basing has reinvigorated discussions about
the need for mobile offshore bases (MOBs) that have continued since Admiral
81
William Owens first raised the idea in the mid-1990s. Thus, for example, some
planners want next-generation Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or
MPF(F), vessels to have “the ability to selectively onload and offload military
82
gear at sea.” One concrete means to accomplish sea basing that differs somewhat from the MOB concept involves combining the Joint Command and Control Ship, or JCC(X), with the MPF(F) program.
Although, again, it is too early to know what form Sea Basing will take as it
moves beyond the concept development stage, some form of a MOB could provide a transformational capability. At least for some missions and finite periods
of time, they would free American forces from the tyranny of land bases. They
would also tie the Navy still more closely to its Marine and Army counterparts,
placing it in a distinctly supporting role and making it joint in a way envisioned
only in rhetoric today.
ForceNet. The claim that the range of Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing capabilities are indeed transformational rests largely on ForceNet. ForceNet was presented in the Naval Transformation Roadmap as the Navy’s framework for
83
implementing network-centric warfare. Originally developed by the Chief of
Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group, it has been billed variously as
putting the “warfare” in network-centric warfare and as “the next generation
of NCW.” According to Admiral Clark, ForceNet is the plan for making NCW an
“operational reality”: it will integrate “warriors, sensors, command and control,
84
platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force.” This
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planned network of networks and system of systems is expected to be the
information-technology backbone of information-age naval warfare. Today the
ForceNet concept serves as an umbrella both for existing programs such as the
NMCI, IT-21, CEC, and NFN and for major future programs such as the ESG
and the Expeditionary Command and Control, Communications, Computers,
and Combat Systems Grid (EC5G)(see figure 2).
It is the connectivity and synergy to be provided by such efforts that is intended to be the source of any transformation brought about by SP-21’s core
FIGURE 2
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ForceNet. The weight of Navy
transformation rests on ForceNet. Unless its promises are realized, the potential
of platforms such as CVN(X), DD(X), CG(X), LCS, and SSGNs; unmanned
aerial, surface, and undersea vehicles; and combat force structures such as “expeditionary strike groups” and missile-defense surface action groups will not be
fully exploited.
A principal “enabling element” of ForceNet is the planned set of information,
sensor, and engagement grids capable of linking all elements of the network
with each other and with the wider information “back plane” that constitutes
the World Wide Web and Defense Department–specific networks. This is not a
single network but a network of networks, “a global grid of multiple,
90
interoperable, overlapping sensor, engagement, and command nets.” The success of ForceNet requires the development, procurement, and deployment of
large numbers of more capable sensors to populate the sensor grid and provide a
common operational picture.
Among existing programs, as illustrated in figure 3, the Cooperative Engagement Capability, IT-21, the Radar Modernization Program (RMP), the Web
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Time Lines

high

Centric Anti-Submarine Warfare Net (WeCAN), and the Navy–Marine Corps
Intranet will help the Navy evolve further toward the ability to conduct network91
centric operations. A critical step is the deployment of a multitiered—space,
air, surface/ground and undersea—expeditionary sensor grid combining,
among other things, invasive sensing systems, unmanned platforms, massively
distributed information systems, and computer network attack and defense ca92
pabilities. At its simplest, the ESG is a “toolbox of sensors and networks neces93
sary to build . . . real-time battlespace awareness.”
A network-centric future has implications for the Navy’s doctrine, organization, and relationship with the other services. In 1998, the Navy Warfare Development Command was stood up as an institutional champion for innovation. It
was specifically tasked to develop new concepts of operations and new doctrine.
In addition to NCO, it is developing operational concepts for Sea Strike, Sea
Shield, and Sea Basing. Also in development are a range of supporting and functional concepts for informational
FIGURE 3
THE INFORMATION GRID: DETAILED VIEW
operations, homeland defense, theater air and missile defense, future
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In addition to the establishment
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Source: Jim Eagle’s Web Page, Operations Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
Command, there have been a numCalifornia, spica.or.nps.navy.mil/netusw/CebrowskiNetWar/sld005.htm.
ber of other organizational initiatives. Under Admiral Clark, NWDC itself has been subordinated to the
Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (CFFC), Sea Trial’s designated lead
agent, to coordinate experimentation programs. To facilitate integrated platform and network planning, the Navy Staff ’s N6 and N7 codes have been
merged under a new Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, who was designated the director of ForceNet. Information
operations have been added to the list of major warfare areas, and the Naval
Network Warfare Command has been established to coordinate information
94
technology and information operations activities. None of these initiatives,
however, yet poses a serious challenge to the dominance of the Navy’s platformcentric baronies.
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The shift to a network-centric force could have profound implications for the
Navy’s relationship with its sister services. ForceNet and its NCW/NCO foundation assume a high level of jointness and interoperability. The language of
jointness and interoperability actually suffuses all of Sea Power 21. Sea Strike’s operational capabilities are to be employed in joint campaigns; Sea Shield is to provide protection for the joint force; and Sea Basing is to support joint operations.
The promise of jointness has serious implications for the implementation of
ForceNet. If jointness is to be taken seriously and the advantages of connectivity
and integration are to be exploited fully, all of the military’s offensive and defensive capabilities, not just the Navy’s, must be networked. A common operational
picture, for instance, is not really common unless it is shared by the Air Force and
the Army as well as by the Navy and the Marine Corps. The difficulties of ensuring
a common operational picture should not be underestimated, however. How is it
to be achieved? Should the services pursue separate but coordinated capabilities?
If so, can they be confident that the resulting systems will mesh to form an integrated system of systems with the seamless connectivity required for a joint COP?
Or should the approach be joint from the start, with system acquisition assumed
by the Joint Staff or Joint Forces Command and the services required to tailor
their new platforms to joint NCW requirements? There is an undeniable logic to
the joint acquisition of joint capabilities. That logic is particularly compelling in
the case of the network capabilities that are at the heart of the sought-after transformation. The jointness required to realize fully NCW’s potential may be profoundly transformational. A truly joint Navy would be a transformed Navy. But
that does not appear to be the transformation the Navy has in mind.
IS THE LACK OF TRANSFORMATION A PROBLEM?
Thus far, what passes for transformation within the Navy is less revolutionary
than official rhetoric suggests. Even under a best-case scenario—where most if
not all of the Navy embraces current transformation initiatives, the resources
necessary to implement transformation are readily available, and the technological challenges inherent in developing new capabilities are met—it is difficult to
avoid concluding that the Navy after next will be a modernized version of the existing fleet. It is possible that over time the accumulation of small-bore changes
will yield a force that deserves to be characterized as transformed. However, the
prospects for discontinuous, disruptive change appear slim.
Programs billed as transformational will add important capabilities to the
Navy. The Navy’s abilities to collect and share information, sustain operations,
operate in a more stealthy fashion, and directly contribute to the defense of the
American homeland will improve. But these capabilities are unlikely to provide
the virtual “lockout” of competitor options envisioned by proponents of
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transformation. Nor will they prevent adversaries from devising asymmetric
strategies for countering U.S. naval power. But they may further ongoing
changes in the organization of the Navy, its culture, and perhaps even the nature
of the officers and enlisted men and women serving their country.
95
Is the lack of real transformation a problem? Not especially. In our view, no
compelling strategic rationale for transformation has yet been articulated.
Transformation that equates to a revolution in military affairs is not required for
the maintenance and extension of either U.S. military dominance specifically or
American primacy generally. Nor is it a requirement for fighting and winning
the global war on terror. Generic capabilities designed to meet generic threats
(as in capabilities-based planning) or old threats pumped up for a new millennium (as in threat-based planning against a North Korean foe) in the service of
force protection will suffice in the absence of a clear and present danger on the
order of that posed by the former Soviet Union.
According to the NTR, the objective of naval transformation is “to achieve a
broad, sustained and decisive military competitive advantage over existing or
96
potential adversaries.” The Navy, however, already possesses that competitive
advantage. It is the world’s preeminent naval force. It already exercises virtually
unchallenged command of the seas and possesses unrivaled power projection
capabilities. There is nobody in the rear-view mirror. At worst, the Navy will face
asymmetric challenges in the littoral and perhaps the emergence of a regional
competitor, such as China. While these are difficult challenges, there seems little
reason to think that they constitute a “competitive challenge” to the dominance
of the U.S. Navy. That preserving and extending its preeminence requires “substantially extending boundaries of necessary military competencies and . . . dis97
covering fundamentally new approaches to military operations” remains to be
demonstrated. What future challengers require that the Navy embrace fundamentally new approaches that challenge it to reinvent itself?
The Navy that will gradually emerge from the naval transformation enterprise will be well suited to carry out the roles and missions implied by the evolving U.S. grand strategy initiated by the Clinton administration and more fully,
and bluntly, articulated by its successor. The Navy will be better equipped to
strike terrorists and rogue states posing either conventional or WMD threats to
the American homeland, installations abroad, or allies. It will contribute to both
active and passive defense against ballistic missile threats. And it will operate
more jointly than in the past and with a high level of connectivity.
Civilian officials in the Department of Defense intent on transformation may
indeed feel that attempting to change the Navy (and the rest of the military) is
like punching a pillow. But the Navy’s modernization-plus approach is likely to
provide the nation with the capabilities required for the future.
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